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Nearly one in five full-time equivalent employees in the United States 
works for some branch of  government; one-fifth of compensation of 
employees is paid by  governments.  In many labor markets  such as 
those for school teachers, protective  service workers, health sector 
workers, government plays an even larger, sometimes predominant role 
on the demand side of markets. 
How do governments act as employers of labor? Are public sector 
wages and employment unresponsive to changing economic conditions, 
as is often held? Are government workers generally paid a premium 
over comparable private sector workers or do public-private pay dif- 
ferentials vary with economic conditions? What economic forces in- 
fluence public pay and employment? 
In spite of  wide recognition of the importance of the public sector 
as an employer of  labor, these questions  pertaining  to the  respon- 
siveness of the wage and employment of  government workers have 
been rarely addressed. This chapter sets out the basic “facts”  about 
public  sector wage  and  employment  patterns  in  the  United  States 
and  develops  a relatively  simple  empirical  model  of  public  sector 
wage and employment setting which answers the questions of concern. 
The principle findings of this chapter are: 
1. The pay of public sector workers relative to private sector workers 
varies greatly over time. Contrary to the view that public sector pay 
is inflexible, variations in relative pay are due as much to fluctuations 
in public pay as to fluctuations in private pay. 
2. The relatively high-paid public sector worker of  the earl  1970s 
has within the span of a decade lost much of his or her advantage over 
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otherwise comparable private sector workers, seriously denting if  not 
destroying the picture of  the “overpaid”  public employee which de- 
veloped in the early  1970s. The public sector workers who tend to be 
most highly paid in the United States relative to private sector workers 
are blacks and women, suggesting that the public sector has a better 
equal employment/affirmative  action record than does the private sector. 
3. Differentials in public  and  private  sector pay  vary greatly  de- 
pending on the nature of comparisons. For example, Current Population 
Survey comparisons of individuals with similar broad  human capital 
show federal employees to be higher paid than private employees, while 
Bureau of Labor Statistics surveys of wage rates in particular occu- 
pations show federal workers to be lower paid. 
4.  Public sector employment follows a very different pattern of change 
than private sector employment. There is less annual variation in public 
sector than in private sector employment. The rate of growth of  state 
and local employment tends to be countercyclical rather than cyclical, 
while federal employment growth tends to be countercyclical or less 
procyclical than private employment growth. In terms of demographic 
composition,  the  public  sector employs relatively  more  blacks  and 
women than the private sector, reinforcing the belief that the govern- 
ment  offers  their workers  better job opportunities  than  the  private 
sector. 
5. Budgets are, not surprisingly, a major determinant of state and 
local public sector wage and employment. At the state and local level 
an increase in the ratio of budgets to GNP raises relative employment 
by much more than it raises relative wages. Because of  differences in 
the response of the public sector and private sector to broad economic 
developments, public sector employment rises relatively in recessions 
and falls relatively in booms, while relative wages move in the opposite 
direction. Relative  state and local public  sector employment  tends, 
moreover, to fall in periods of rapid inflation. By contrast, federal wage 
and employment, which constitute only a small proportion of budgets 
and can be financed by deficit financing, do not exhibit a well-defined 
relationship to various measures of budget size. 
8.1  Changing Patterns of  Pay 
The principal phenomenon of  concern to this study-changes in the 
relative pay of public sector workers-is  depicted in figure 8.1.  This fig- 
ure shows that the ratio of total compensation of public sector workers 
relative to private sector workers in the National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA) has varied greatly in recent decades and in the Great 
Depression and World War 11. During the depression, nominal public 
pay remained roughly constant while private nominal pay fell, produc- 185  Public Sector Wages and Employment Response 
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Fig. 8.1  Ratio of federal civilian pay to private sector pay and of state 
and local government pay to private sector pay. 
ing a substantial public pay advantage. During World War 11, private pay 
rose rapidly, lowering the public-private differential. From roughly the 
mid-1950s to the 1960s, public sector pay rose relative to private sector 
pay, while beginning in the mid-1970s relative public sector pay fell. 
The changes in relative pay shown in figure 8.1 could have resulted 
largely from movements in private pay or largely from movements in 
public pay or from roughly equal movements in the two series. The 
notion that public pay is “inflexible”  relative to private pay implies 
that it is movements of the latter that underly the changes in the figure. 
To  test this notion I have decomposed the relative pay measures in 
several  ways,  using  variants  of  the  basic  variance  decomposition 
formula: 
(1)  a2  In  a = a2 In  wg  + 02  In wp  - 2a (In  w, In  wp),  [ (31 
where wg  = wage in government sector, 
wp  = wage in private sector, 
In  = log, 
a2 = variance, 
u  = covariance. 186  Richard B. Freeman 
The variants of  the decomposition formula I use are: (1) decompo- 
sition of the ratio of real wages; (2)  decomposition of the level of real 
wages  after removing a linear trend  term; (3) decomposition of, or 
changes in  money wages; (4) decomposition after an autoregressive 
adjustment of the underlying series. 
The results of  the exercise (summarized in  table 8.A.1)  show that 
public sector pay varies over time more or less as much as private 
sector pay,  so the notion of a relatively  inflexible public sector pay 
does not  stand up to scrutiny. The changes in the ratio of public to 
private sector pay in figure 8.1 are due roughly as much to variations 
in the former as to variations in the latter. 
8.2  The 1970s Decline in Relative Public Pay 
The view that public sector workers are “overpaid” gained support 
as the result  of  a set of  studies of  public  sector wages in  the early 
1970s. As Figure  8.1 shows, the ratio of  public to private pay  was 
especially high then and declined thereafter. Because the drop in the 
relative public pay in the 1970s calls into question the “overpaid public 
employee”  whose wages are insulated from the economy, I  examine 
a wide variety of data pertaining to relative public sector wages, in- 
cluding the payroll data of federal, state, and local governments, the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics comparability surveys, U.S. Civil Service 
Commission reports, and March and May Current Population Surveys 
of  individuals. As my concern is more with changes than with levels 
of relative pay, I do not address the issue of who should be compared 
to whom for the purpose of deciding whether public workers are over- 
paid, nor do I deal with issues of job security, fringe benefits, turnover 
rates and the like, which must also enter an evaluation of relative public 
sector compensation. 
8.3  NIPA and Payroll Data 
Table 8.1 presents information on the ratio of public to private sector 
pay for all workers in the sectors from 1970 to 1983 as reported in the 
National Income and Product Accounts. Column (1) in table 8.1 records 
the ratio of  “wages and salaries per full-time equivalent employees” 
for federal civilian employees relative to those in private industry. The 
drop of 15 points from the peak 1973 year to 1983 is sizeable, although 
it must be put into perspective by  noting that relative pay increased 
by more than 15 points over the previous decade. Column (2)  records 
comparable ratios for state and local government workers, including 
those in education. Here the drop is much less severe, with a partial 187  Public Sector Wages and Employment Response 
Table 8.1  Ratios of  Federal Civilian and State and Local Government Wages 
and Salaries, to Private Industry Wages and Salaries, for Full-Time 
Equivalent Workers 
Wage and Salary of  Group Relative to Private 
Federal  Federal  State & Local 
Civilian  State & Local  Enterprise  Enterprise  Education 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1950  1.20  .91  1.10  1.06  .92 
1960  1.25  .93  1.03  .98  .98 
1970  1.42  I .06  1.14  1.07  1.06 
1971  1.45  1.04  1.12  1.10  1.08 
1972  1.46  1.03  1.18  1.11  1.08 
1973  1.48  1.04  1.21  1.13  1.07 
1974  1.43  1.02  1.24  1.06  1.04 
1975  1.43  1.01  1.25  1.08  I .05 
1976  1.42  1.01  I .27  1.08  1.05 
1977  1.43  1.01  1.27  1.06  1.04 
1978  1.44  .99  1.27  1.04  1.02 
1979  1.39  .97  1.25  1.02  1.005 
1980  1.35  .96  1.27  1.02  ,982 
1981  1.34  .95  1.32  1.03  ,975 
1982  1.33  .97  1.28  1.05  ,985 
1983  1.33  1  .oo  1.29  1.08  1.01 
A  1973-83  -.15  -  .04  .08  -  .05  -  .06 
Source: Calculated from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
National Income and Product Accounts. 
recovery for relative public sector pay from  1982 to 1983, when the 
economy entered its worst recession since the 1930s; at the same time, 
the increase in relative pay in earlier decades is also less marked. 
How did relative public sector pay stand in 1983 compared to earlier 
years? In  1983 federal civilian pay was 33  percent above the private 
sector average; from 1950 to 1983 it averaged 32 percent above. In 1983 
state and local pay stood at 3 percent below the private sector average; 
from 1950 to 1983 it averaged 4 percent below. Hence, by 1983 relative 
government pay seemed roughly to be at its post-1950 average. 
The figures in columns (3) and (4) treat government enterprises. In 
the federal government this includes the Post Office, Tennessee Valley 
Authority, and related organizations. For the state and local govern- 
ments, it includes public utilities and the like. A different pattern emerges 
in these data: a rise in the ratio of federal enterprise to private sector 
pay is contrasted with a decline in the ratio of state and local enterprise 
to private sector pay. Finally, column (5) treats education, where we 
find a decline of  10 points from 1970 to 1982, followed by an increase 
of  .03 from 1982 to 1983. 188  Richard B. Freeman 
The disparate patterns suggest the value of a more disaggregate look 
at various publicly employed groups distinguished by function, level 
of government, and occupation, to which we turn next. 
Table 8.2 records data from the government employment and payroll 
survey of the Bureau of the Census. It shows a sharp decline in the 
pay of federal workers under the General Service schedule (GS) system 
(covering federal white-collar  workers), which is roughly consistent 
with the NIPA figures, but a somewhat more complex pattern of change 
for workers paid under the WS (blue collar) and PS (postal employees) 
systems. In  these cases relative  wages turn  down in the late  1970s 
rather than earlier and fall much less dramatically. For state and local 
government employees, the payroll data show a moderate decline in 
public-private pay differentials. Decomposed into education and other 
government functions, the figures for municipalities show a much greater 
concentration of the decline in the education sector than found in table 
8.1, and also a partial recovery for both education and other municipal 
workers in the 1980s. 
Because federal GS employee pay increases are legislated by Con- 
gress, it is possible to compare the observed changes in  GS pay to 
the  changes that would  result  if  legislated  increases  were  the  sole 
cause of  change. In the period  1972-82,  legislated federal increases 
amounted to 84 percent of  1972 salary compared to an actual change 
Table 8.2  Ratios of  Public Sector Earnings Reported in Payroll Series to the 
Private Industry Wage and Salaries, 1970-82 
Federal  Municipal 

















1.44  .89  1.05  1.07 
1.44  .92  1.09  1.06 
1.45  .96  -  1.07 
1.44  .98  -  1.09 
1.38  1 .oo  1.19  1.08 
1.34  I .03  1.23  I .06 
1.33  1.07  1.23  1.06 
1.32  1.16  1.23  1.06 
1.33  1.18  1.23  1.05 
1.29  1.16  -  1.04 
1.25  1.12  1.14  1.03 
1.26  1.12  1.09  1.03 
1.25  1.10  -  - 
-.20  -.08  -.04  -.06 
1.06  1.31 
I .04  1.29 
1.07  1.32 
1.07  1.37 
1.06  1.29 
I .04  1.27 
1.03  1.26 
1.03 
1  .oo 
.99 
.98  1.14 
.99  1.18 
-  1.19 











-  .05 
Sources: Federal, state, local from U.S. Bureau of the Census Payroll Series; municipal 
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of  77 percent  of  1972 salary.  Increases in  the  average  GS  level  of 
federal employees explain the change in  salary above the legislated 
amount. As table 8.A.2 shows, these increases were concentrated in 
the latter part of the 1970s and early 1980s. From 1977 to 1982, grade 
increases  (plus  a minor  “step  creep,”  defined  as  increases  in  pay 
due to changes in the “steps”  of  workers within a GS level) raised 
pay  by  9  percent  compared  to  an  increase  in  pay  due  to  grade 
increases of  3.4 percent from  1972 to 1977. Had the federal govern- 
ment  not  upgraded  the  GS  level  of  its  work  force-which  could 
represent a “true” increase in skill level, or a “creep” up in response 
to market  conditions-the  1982  ratio  of  federal  GS pay  to private 
sector pay  in  column  (1) would have been  1.19. This result  implies 
that federal GS pay fell by  25 percentage points relative to private 
sector pay, grade held constant. 
8.4  Rates of  Pay for Comparable Workers 
The comparisons of  public  and private pay thus far are crude in 
that they do not compare workers in the same occupation or with the 
same skills.  There  are two basic  ways  to make  such more  refined 
calculations:  (1) use occupational wage rates on the pay in  detailed 
occupations; (2) use individual-level data on the pay of  workers with 
similar personal  characteristics.  The former method  contrasts wage 
rates actually used in wage setting; the latter method contrasts earnings 
with those of workers having comparable age, education, and the like. 
Which is “better”  depends on the quality of  data and purpose of  the 
comparison. 
Table 8.3 uses federal professional, administrative, technical, and 
clerical  (PATC)  survey  data to make  such  comparisons  for  white- 
collar  workers.  The PATC  survey  provides  information  on  average 
annual wages  for occupations  in  the  private  sector comparable  to 
those  in  the  public  sector for  each  grade  of  the  general  schedule 
(white-collar workers) of the civil service. According to the principle 
of  federal pay in the federal Pay Comparability Act of  1970, adjust- 
ments  in  general schedule salaries are supposed to ensure that  Oc- 
tober federal wages are equal to comparable private sector wages of 
the previous  March.  When recommending actual wage increases to 
Congress, however, the president can suggest wage changes not based 
on the PATC, and of  course Congress can enact higher or lower pay 
increases. Each year since 1977 the president has recommended lower 
increases. 
The figures in table 8.3 report (unweighted) average ratios of federal 
to comparable private sector pay within GS classes. To  assure com- 
parability of data over time, the averages are limited to occupations 190  Richard B. Freeman 
Table 8.3  Ratios of Federal GS Pay to Private Sector “Comparable” Pay for 
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.99  .93 
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1.02  .91 
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-  .25 
-  .20 
-  .36 
-  .2s 
-  .23 
-.I6 
-  .21 
~  .24 
-  .28 
-  .32 
-  .23 
Source: Tabulated from U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics. 
Noret For comparability over time, the figures report unweighted averages of occupa- 
tional  ratios only for occupations reporting in  1972 and in all later years. The pattern 
for other occupations included in later surveys is consistent with that in the table. I have 
left out GS-8 because there were no occupations in  1972 and GS-6 because only one 
occupation was reported in  1972. 
that report pay in each year from 1972 to 1983. While the data can be 
summarized in other ways (weighted averages; inclusion of occupations 
contained in one year’s survey but not in another year’s survey), the 
pattern is sufficiently clear to require no more detailed computations. 
The effect of presidential recommendations of lower than comparable 
pay  increases and of  resultant congressional action in the  1970s has 
been to reduce relative federal pay falls sharply in all GS levels, with 
an unweighted average decline of 23 percentage points! 
Table 8.4 records the results of similar comparisons for clerical and 
skilled maintenance workers for the federal government, for clerical 
and  skilled maintenance workers  in  municipal government  employ- 
ment, and for fire fighters, police, and teachers. At the federal level 
we see the drop in relative pay for clerical workers but not for skilled 
maintenance workers. At the municipal level we see sharp drops for 
all occupations, with police and fire fighters experiencing surprisingly 
large declines, nearly as great as those for teachers. 
All told, these comparisons of workers in given occupations suggest 
that the drop in public-private pay indicated in tables 8.1 and 8.2 may 
underestimate the fall in public sector pay, particularly for employees 
of local governments. 191  Public Sector Wages and Employment Response 
Table 8.4  Municipal and Federal Government Salaries Compared to Those in 
Private Industry, 1970-80 
Ratio of Government Salary 
to Private Industry 
1970  1975  1980  A 
Federal 
Clerical  -  1 .oo  .85  -.I5 
Skilled maintenance  -  1.01  1  .oo  -  .01 
Clerical  -  I .04  .98  -  .06 
Skilled maintenance  -  I .07  .97  -.I0 
Policemen  1.10  1.05  .96  -  .I4 
Fire fighters  1.05  1.01  .91  -  .I4 




Sources:  U.S. Department of  Labor, Clerical and Skilled Maintenance: A Comparison 
in  Large Labor Markets,  Monrhly Labor Review, July  1981, table  1. Police and fire 
fighters: U.S. Bureau of  Census 1984, 187; 
Teachers: National Center for Education Statistics, The Condirion  of Education, 1984, 
table 1.19. 
8.5  Current Population Survey 
An alternate, widely used way to compare workers with similar at- 
tributes is to use data on individuals from the Current Population Sur- 
vey tapes. These tapes provide detailed information on personal char- 
acteristics of workers but less adequate information on occupation and, 
in some cases, on type of employer. The CPS tapes contain two ques- 
tions on public sector employment: a class-of-worker question, which 
divides workers between private employment, self-employment, and 
governmental employment, and the “industry”-of-employment  ques- 
tion, which includes public administration by level of government. As 
the claim that government workers are overpaid received its strongest 
support in Sharon Smith’s analysis of CPS tapes in the mid-l970s, it 
is important to see how public-private pay differentials have changed 
in the CPS. 
Table 8.5 presents the results of an analysis of usual hourly pay from 
the May CPS tapes for 1973, 1978, and 1983, and of  annual earnings 
from the March CPS tapes for 1968, 1977, and 1982. While there are 
some inconsistencies between the two CPS surveys and between them 
and the earlier data sources, the general picture of  declining public 
sector differentials in the 1970s holds for most government branches. 
In particular, both the May and March CPS files show declines in the 
relative  pay  of  all government employees in  the  1970s, though  the 192  Richard B. Freeman 
Table 8.5  Estimates of the Effect of Government Employment on  the Pay of 
Workers, Controlling for Demographic and Occupational 
Characteristics, 1969-83 
A. Usual Hourly Earnings, May Current Population Tapes 
Group and Percent 
Employed  1973  1978  1983  A 
Number of observations  34935  39092  1226  1 
Government worker  .06  .02  .02  -  .04 
Type 
State public admin.  .06  .01  .04  -  .02 
Local public admin.  -  .03  -  .07  .06  .09 
Nonpublic admin.  .01  -  .04  -  .04  -  .05 
Federal public admin.  .26  21  .I9  -  .07 
Teacher  .01  -  .08  -  .06  -  .07 
Postal  .18  .31  .26  .08 
Fire fighters  .I4  .14  .ll  -  .03 
Police  .41  .34  .33  -  .08 
B. Annual Earnings, March Current Population Tapes 
1972  I977  1982  A 
Number of observations 
Government worker 
TYP 
Federal public admin. 
State public admin. 








-  .05 
.01 







-  .02 
-  .07 
.28 
47478 
.01  -  .05 
.I8  -.I1 
.06  .01 
.I0  .15 
-  .07  -  .08 
-.11  -.I0 
.30  .08 
Source: Tabulated from May and March Current Population Surveys. Based on  log linear 
regressions with demographic, occupation, and industry controls. 
magnitude of the drop differs with the survey, group, and years covered. 
The coefficients on federal public administration in the May tape in- 
dicate a sizeable 7 point drop and an 11 point drop in the March tape. 
The pay of teachers drops more sharply in the March CPS, and both 
tapes show drops for nonpublic administration and rises, 8 points, for 
postal workers. The principal aberrant result is the rise in pay in local 
public administration found in both CPS tapes, which contrasts with 
virtually all other data on local pay rates. The result may be due to 
the change in classification between the 1982 and 1983 surveys, due to 
implementation of  1980 census definition as described in Appendix C. 
When we turn to the level of public-to-private pay differentials and 
to the magnitude of changes in differentials, the difference between 
CPS-based data and the other data sets examined in this study becomes 
striking indeed. In general the CPS-based data show smaller relative 193  Public Sector Wages and Employment Response 
declines in public sector pay than do  the payroll (NIPA) and occupation- 
based data and higher public-to-private ratios of relative pay, and also 
show significant differences in the levels of relative pay in some cases. 
In particular, in the PATC and other detailed job surveys we find federal 
GS workers paid less than other workers; in the CPS we find workers 
in federal public administration earning more than the typical private 
sector  worker  in  the  same  occupation,  with  the  same  personal 
characteristics. 
There are two basic reasons for this inconsistency. First, in contrast 
to the CPS which  gathers data on all workers, the PATC  survey is 
limited  to workers in  relatively  large firms, whose pay  traditionally 
exceeds that of workers in smaller firms. Whether this makes the CPS 
or PATC comparisons “better” is a matter of judgment. Some (Perloff 
and Wachter  1984) have interpreted comparability as calling for com- 
parisons of federal employees with all workers. Others argue that it is 
wrong to compare employees of the largest  single enterprise in the 
United States to workers from Joe’s corner store, making the PATC 
comparison a more accurate picture of  where the federal government 
stands in labor markets. Second is the difference between comparisons 
of wages in  well-defined jobs and of wages  of persons with  similar 
demographic characteristics. Here the PATC data has a clear advantage 
because it refers to specific occupations (computer programmer,  ac- 
countant) for which the federal government hires persons, rather than 
to broadly defined groups (professionals, with college education, of a 
given age), most of whose members may lack the skill for the particular 
job. 
Finally, it is important to  recognize that part of the observed premium 
to federal public administration  shown in  table 8.5 reflects  different 
public rather than private pay policies toward minorities and women. 
Table 8.6 documents this point for usual hourly earnings in May 1983 
and for annual earnings, adjusted for hours and weeks worked in 1977 
and 1982. In all periods and surveys, public employees tend to have 
smaller differences in pay by sex and by race than private employees, 
though there is some indication that the differential between sectors 
narrowed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As Asher and Popkin (1984) 
have  stressed, to the extent that government pay  is relatively  good 
because of more equal treatment of minorities and women, interpre- 
tation  of Current Population  Survey differentials in terms of  “over- 
paid” government workers requires reconsideration by analysts. 
8.6  Changing Patterns of Employment 
It is well known that in the post-World  War I1 period, public sector 
employment has risen relative to private sector employment. In 1950 
15.6 percent of full-time equivalent workers were government employ- 194  Richard B. Freeman 
Table 8.6  Regression Estimates and Standard Errors: Effect of Ethnicity and 
Sex on Pay, by  Public and Private Sector 
Hourly 
Earnings 
Annual Earnings, Controlling 



















ees;  in 1983 19 percent of full-time equivalent workers were government 
employees. 
In this section I examine the pattern of change in public sector em- 
ployment over the cycle, and by level of government and type of work- 
ers. The evidence shows public sector employment not only to be less 
variable over time than private sector employment but also to exhibit 
a  strikingly different  pattern  of  change  over the business  cycle.  In 
addition, the public sector employs relatively more blacks and women 
than the private sector, which, in conjunction with the relatively higher 
pay shown in table 8.6, suggests greater public sector demand for those 
workers. 
Figure 8.2 depicts the ratios of federal civilian to private employment 
and of  state and local to private employment from  1950 to  1983, as 195  Public Sector Wages and Employment Response 
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Fig. 8.2  Ratio of federal government to private employment and state 
and local government to private employment. 
given in the NIPA data set. With respect to state and local employment, 
the data show a marked rise until the mid-l970s, followed by a relatively 
sharp decline. Indeed, from 1981 to 1983 state and local employment 
actually fell, partly as a result of reductions in CETA employment, and 
partly as a result of declines in education due to changes in the size of 
the school age population. At the federal level, the employment share 
follows a very different pattern: from the early 1950s to the late 1960s 
it is roughly constant at 3.8 percent to 3.9 percent of nonagricultural 
employment. Thereafter it drops sharply to less than 3 percent of non- 
agricultural employment. The result is a striking change in the com- 
position of public employment. In 1950 one in three public employees 
was a federal worker; in 1983 one in six was a federal worker. 
What about the cyclical and short-term variation in public employ- 
ment? To determine how public sector employment varies in the short 
run, I have performed a two-part analysis. First I calculated the stan- 
dard deviation of  log changes in employment annually for the public 
and private sectors, over the period 1955-82  (leaving out the Korean 
War period). Such a calculation confirms the widely held belief that 
public sector employment is less variable over time than private sector 196  Richard B. Freeman 
employment, with the following calculated standard deviations:  private 
nonagricultural employment (.026);  federal civilian employment (.020); 
state and local  employment (.017).  Second, I  examined changes in 
employment over NBER business cycles. As table 8.7 shows, there is 
a striking difference in cyclical changes in employment between sec- 
tors, particularly between state and local and private employment; in 
six  of  seven cyclical  swings post-1953,  state and  local  employment 
move  countercyclically.  The growth  of  federal employment moved 
countercyclically in the 1970s but varied with the cycle earlier.  Even 
then, however,  it  showed smaller  cyclic  variation  than private  em- 
ployment. In conjunction  with  our analysis  of changes over time in 
public-private pay differentials, these calculations indicate that public 
sector payrolls vary differently over time than do private sector pay- 
rolls, and thus must be responding to unique public sector factors rather 
than to broad swings in the overall state of the economy. 
8.7  Sex and Race 
Our earlier analysis found that pay differentials by sex and race were 
smaller in public than in private employment. What about patterns of 
employment? Table 8.8 records the race and sex distribution of private 
and public employment in  1978 and 1983. It shows that governments 
tend to hire  proportionally  more blacks  and women than does the 
private sector, though with noticeable variation among levels of growth. 
In the 1978-83  period, the proportion of blacks in government relative 
to the proportion of blacks  in the private sector rose while the pro- 
portion of women in government increased above the 50 percent rate. 
8.8  Budgets and Macrodeterminants of  Public Sector Wage  and 
Employment Changes 
Preceding sections have shown that far from being inflexible or rigid, 
public sector wages have changed substantially relative to private sec- 
tor wages over time, and that the growth of public sector employment 
varies over time. Can we identify  the factors that affect the ratio of 
public to private pay, and that affect the variability  of public sector 
employment? 
In this section I examine the hypothesis that the public sector, like 
other “industries,” alters employment and wages in response to changes 
in the economic conditions and incentives facing it. What distinguishes 
public from private sectors is that the principal economic force on the 
public side is not the competitive economic market but budgets deter- 
mined in political markets. In Dunlop’s words, “the public sector re- 
sponds to the discipline of the budget rather than to the discipline of Table 8.7  Employment Changes over the Business Cycle, Public versus Private Employers 
Average Percentage Change per Year 
Recession  Recovery  Recovery-Recession 
Period (peak-trough-peak)  Private  Federal  State  Local  Private  Federal  State  Local  Private  Federal  State  Local 
July 53-May  54-Aug  57 
Aug 57-Apr  58-Apr  60 
Apr 60-Feb  61-Dec  69 
Dec 69-Nov  70-Nov  73 
Nov 73-Mar  75-Jan  80 
Jan 80-July  80-July  81 
July 81-Nov  82-June  84 
-5.6 




1  .O 
~  2.4 
-6.4  13.1  3.0  0.8  4.1  8.6  7.2  -9.0 
-4.2  12.5  5.1  3.7  5.1  4.5  3.6  14.4  9.3  -8.0  -1.5 
-8.8  5.6  4.5  4.0  2.7  7.4  5.8  9.7  11.6  1.8  1.3 
-5.1  7.9  5.5  3.8  -0.2  3.0  4.5  7.4  4.9  -4.9  - 1.0 
2.0  5.9  4.3  4.4  0.3  1.9  2.1  8.8  -1.7  -4.0  -2.2 
10.3  6.6  10.8  3.2  -4.0  -0.4  -1.8  2.2  -15.3  -7.0  -12.6 
2.9  5.9  4.1  4.9  2.2  -2.2  -0.0  7.3  -0.7  -8.1  - 4.1 
Source: Business cycles, based on NBER Reference Cycles Employment, from U.S. Department of Labor Employment 
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Table 8.8  Percentage of Female and Black Workers, by Employer, 1978-83 
March Tapes 
1978  1983 
Blacks 
Private  ,083  .073 
Public  ,114  ,115 
Private  .414  ,446 
Public  ,492  ,522 
Women 
Source: Calculated from March CPS tapes. 
the market.”  I shall take as given the sizes of  budgets or tax rates, 
although in a complete model they are certainly endogenous, and ex- 
amine  how  short-term variations in  budgets  influence public  sector 
wages and employment in the same way that one might examine how 
short-term variations in industry output and prices (value added, pro- 
ductivity, profits) affect private wages and employment. Because of 
the very different way in which decisions are likely to be affected by 
budgets  by  level of  government,  such an  analysis must  distinguish 
between federal and state or local governments. State and local gov- 
ernments face, in general, hard budget constraints, whereas the federal 
government can run continual deficits to fund its outlays. There is a 
serious budget constraint in the one case, but not in the other, which 
we expect to produce differential employment and wage responses to 
budgetary changes. 
To  begin, table 8.9 presents readily available figures on payrolls and 
budgets in the period. It is designed to provide a crude indication of 
the extent to which governments faced budget “crunches” in the 1970s. 
At the federal level, outlays as a share of GNP rose sharply in  the 
period covered, without a compensating increase in taxes, producing 
a sizeable deficit. Despite increases in outlays, however, the ratio of 
federal compensation to GNP fell, indicative of  a sizeable decline in 
the payroll share of budgets. As lines 2a-2d  in table 8.9 show, the only 
budget figures against which payroll shares have not dropped drastically 
are “controllable outlays.” 
At the state and local level, receipts have risen more rapidly than 
outlays, producing surpluses, and payrolls have risen relative to GNP 
(and to private sector payrolls). However, the share of payroll in bud- 
gets has been relatively fixed over time. Here, the problem with a simple 
“budget crunch” story of employment and pay changes is the surpluses 
run. Payrolls could have been increased by nearly  15 percent had the 
1983 surplus been spent on payrolls and by  4 percent had the payroll 
share of receipts been constant at its 1970 level. 199  Public Sectcr Wages and Employment Response 
Table 8.9  Federal and State and Local Finances and Civilian Payrolls, 
1970-83 
1970  1980  1983 
Federal government 
1.  Financial variables 
as percentage of  GNP 
b. Receipts  19.9  20.9  18.7 
d.  Civilian compensation  2.4  2.0  1.9 
2.  Payroll as percentage 
of  budget variables 
a. Outlays  14.6  10.1  8.7 
b.  “Controllable”  outlays  39.5  37.0  36.7 
c.  “Civilian controllable”  127.9  89.4  96.7 
d.  Receipts  14.8  11.1  11.7 
a.  Outlays  20.2  22.9  25.2 
c. Deficit  -0.3  -  2.0  -6.5 
outlays 
State and local government 
Financial variables 
as percentage of  GNP 
a. Outlays  13.5  13.5  13.1 
b. Receipts  13.6  14.7  14.5 
c.  Surplus or deficit  0.2  1.2  1.3 
Payroll as percentage 
of  budget variables 
a.  Outlays  53.4  53.4  55.6 
b.  Purchase of  goods &  57.1  55.8  58.1 
c. Receipts  52.5  49.2  50.4 
d. Payroll compensation  7.6  7.7  7.8 
services 
Source:Lines  la-c:  U.S. Bureau of the Census 1984,315; lines Id, 3, and 4: U.S. Bureau 
of  the Census, National Income and Product Accounts; lines 2a-c,  U.S. Bureau of  the 
Census 1984, 318,  333. 
What the figures in table 8.9 suggest is that crude budget pressures 
on public sector payrolls are not enough to explain the observed pat- 
terns of change in public sector payrolls and thus in compensation and 
employment. The budget “constraints”  is not hard enough to be the 
sole factor at work. 
8.9  A Small Regression Model: State and Local Governments 
As a final step in evaluating the pattern of change over time in public 
sector wages and employment, I have estimated the effect of budgets 
and selected macroeconomic variables on relative public sector wages 
and employment. More specifically, I have regressed the ratio of  com- 
pensation and employment in various parts of the public sector on the 200  Richard B. Freeman 
ratio of the relevant budget to GNP, the rate of inflation in the GNP 
deflator, and the level of unemployment. 
The budget/GNP ratio is expected to be the key determinant of rel- 
ative employment and wages, with the relative magnitude of the coef- 
ficients of interest. Inflation is expected to reduce relative public sector 
pay due to the likely slower response of public wages to inflation, while 
unemployment is expected to raise relative state and local employment 
due  to  the  observed  countercyclical  movement  of  public  sector 
employment. 
Table 8.10 presents the results for state and local governments and 
for noneducation activities of these governments. Panel A treats the 
public sector variables relative to private sector variables. The impor- 
tance of public budgets in determining employment and wage is clear 
in the results, with a 10 percent increase in budgets/GNP being divided 
between employment and wages in a ratio of roughly 2 to 1. The mac- 
Table 8.10  Coefficients and Standard Errors for Macroeconomic and Budget 
Determinants of State and Local Public Sector Employment and 
Wages 
A. Employment and Wages Relative to Private Sector 
Expenditures/GNP  P  UNE  R  R* 
State and Local 
1.  Employment  .81  .02  .51  -.61  .965 
~05)  (.26)  ~29) 
2.  Wages  .29  -  .41  -  .47  -58  .810 
(.03)  (. 17)  (.21) 
State and Local Noneducation 
3.  Employment  .65  -  .09  .94  -.75  .922 
(.W  (  .22)  (.39) 
(.05)  (.21)  (  .30) 
B. Employment and Wages 
4.  Wages  .24  -  .08  -  .26  -.64  .580 
State and Local 
5. Employment  .66  .37  .01  -.67  .995 
(.OI)  (.  15)  (.17) 
6.  Wages  .35  -  .78  -.52  -.62  .959 
(.02)  (.22)  (.25) 
State and Local Noneducation 
7.  Employment  .60  .32  .20  -.70  .986 
(  .02)  ~19)  (.23) 
(m  (.21)  (.25) 
8.  Wages  .35  -  .53  -.43  -.61  .948 
Source: Calculated using NIPA data 1952-83. 
Notes:  R  = auto correlation  coefficient; k = log (GNP deflator/GNP  deflator (- 1)); 
UNE = rate of unemployment. 201  Public Sector Wages and Employment Response 
roeconomic factors affect relative pay and employment in the expected 
manner, suggesting that the drop in public sector pay relative to private 
sector pay in the 1970s was at least facilitated by inflation and that the 
weak labor market of the period masked an even greater slowdown in 
relative public sector employment than is indicated in figure 8.2. Some- 
what surprisingly, the figures also show some effect of unemployment 
on wages, with the level and ratio of public to private pay falling with 
high unemployment. Finally, panel B of the table focuses on the level 
of the public sector variables themselves. These calculations show the 
variability and responsiveness of public sector employment and wages 
and also inflation with respect to budgets. 
Several studies of public sector employment have taken wages as 
exogenous and payrolls as exogenous or “predetermined”  by other 
equations (Ehrenberg 1973; Heiney; Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg 1975, 
for example) and examined the elasticity of the employment response 
to wages. While the process of  public sector wage, employment, and 
budget determination is more complex than can be represented by such 
a demand-determined model, it is useful to note that the aggregate time 
series data show such demand-type relations for the state and local 
sectors. Regressing In  employment on In  wages, budget, and macro- 
economic variables yields the following for all state and local workers: 
(1)  In employment = 3.69 + .841n Exp - .08 In PIP (- 1) 
(  .04)  (. 16) 
- .17UNE - S11n wage; 
(. 10) 
R2 = .998; 
and for noneducation state and local workers: 
(2)  In  employment  = 4.33 + .801n Exp + .05 In PIP (- 1) 
(. 16)  (.21) 
+ .05UNE - S61n wage; 
(.23)  (. 16) 
R2 = .994; 
where  the equations were  estimated correcting for first-order  serial 
correlation and where 
UNE = unemployment rate, 
EXP  = budget expenditures, 
P  = GNPdeflator. 202  Richard B. Freeman 
Both equations show that budget expenditures and wages are the 
predominant determinants of employment, with the negative impact of 
wages indicating that demand side behavior dominates the employment 
sphere. Even so, the calculations should be viewed cautiously. With 
nearly half of state and local government employees covered by col- 
lective bargaining, and the division of  a budget a matter for both col- 
lective bargaining and public policy, it is clear that a more complex 
analysis is required to determine the underlying behavior. The devel- 
opment of an appropriate simultaneous employment, wage, and budget 
model lies, however, beyond the purview of this chapter. For our pur- 
poses, it suffices to note that fluctuations in pay and employment are 
related to broader macroeconomic factors and to budgets in a reason- 
able way over time. 
In addition to the estimates given in table 8.10, I performed  com- 
parable calculations for federal government wages and employment. 
These calculations give quite different results, with coefficients on bud- 
gets unstable depending on years selected and precise model specifi- 
cation. These results are roughly consistent with the table 8.9  evidence 
that federal payrolls are too small a proportion of budgets to run into 
significant constraints and that the payroll share of federal budgets has 
been falling, and with the fact that the federal government can and 
does use deficit financing-all  of which suggest no clear stable budget 
“constraint”  on payrolls. 
8.10  Conclusion 
The principal result of this chapter is that public sector relative wages 
and employment change substantially in both the short and long run, 
apparently in response to changes in broad  economic factors and to 
the financial status of the various governments. The 1970s were a period 
of relative decline in public pay, of significant magnitudes at the level 
of specific occupations, and of a slowdown in the growth of government 
employment. This chapter has highlighted the divergent picture one 
gets of  the magnitude of  public sector pay relative to private sector 
pay, dependent on whether one controls for broad human capital or 
looks at specific occupations, but this chapter also finds that nearly all 
data show the same pattern of  change over time. It has documented 
the countercyclical pattern  of public sector employment and  shown 
that variation over time at the state and local level follows reasonable 
patterns with respect to budgets and macroeconomic variables. While 
this chapter leaves open the appropriate model with which we should 
address these response patterns, it has provided a clear answer to the 203  Public Sector Wages and Employment Response 
question posed. Yes, public sector wages and employment respond to 
economic conditions. 
Appendix A 
To evaluate the relative contribution of variation in government and pri- 
vate pay to the observed change in the ratio of pay, we calculated the 
standard deviations of  variation of each component separately, using 
four different forms:(l) variation in levels of log pay; (2) variation in first 
differences in log pay; (3) variation in the deviation of residuals of log 
pay from trend; (4) variation in the residual of log pay from an AR(2) 
process. The results are given in table 8.A.  1 for the period 1952-82. 
Table 8.A.1  Standard Deviation of  Relevant Measures of Wages 
Private  Federal  State & Local 
1. Log of real wages  .126  .I94  ,174 
2.  First difference of  .020  .032  .026 
3.  Residual of  log of  .062  .08  1  ,089 
4.  Residual from AR(2)  .029  .039  .033 
log of real wages 
real wages from trend 
process 
The variation in government pay exceeds that in private pay in lines 
2 and 3 of table 8.A.1, but is less than the variation in private pay in 
lines 1 and 4. Since the results depend on the particular computation, 
we conclude that public sector pay is not noticeably less variable than 
private sector pay. Changes in the private sector denominator do not 
drive changes in relative public sector pay. 
Appendix B 
Calculation of Relative Contributions of 
Scheduled Increases and Increases Due to 
“Grade Creep”  and “Step Creep” in the GS 
Pay Schedule 
There are eighteen grades and ten steps in the GS schedule. Grades 
are for promotion; steps are for longevity and merit pay increases. In 204  Richard B. Freeman 
addition, longevity increases above step 10 are possible. (These ad- 
ditional increases cause some additional calculations below.) 
The relative contributions of the three components were calculated 
as follows: 
A. The average annual salary for the initial year was calculated by 
taking actual salaries (avsal). 
B. The increase attributable  to changes in  the  pay  schedule was 
calculated  by first-year employment by grade and sex to calculate a 
weighted average of the final-year pay structure. Since the number of 
workers above step 10 changes between years, this calculation required 
adjustment of the final-year wage schedule to reflect the number  of 
persons above step 10 in the first year (acin). 
C. Increase in average wage attributable to step and pay increases 
was calculated by taking first-year employment by grade to calculate 
a weighted average of final-year average wage by grade. This reflects 
both the increase in average step and the increase/decrease in the num- 
ber of  persons above step 10 (avslstep). 
D. Increase in  average wage  attributable to step, pay, and grade 
increase was calculated by taking the average wage (avsal) in the final 
year. Thus pay increase = B -  A; step increase = C -  B; and grade 
increase = D -  C.  For the period 1972-82  these calculations are found 
in table 8.A.2. 
Table S.A.2  Comparison of  Scheduled Wage Increases with Increases Due to 
Step and Grade Creep 
1972-82 
Totals  Contributors 
Avsal 72  12552.8  Scheduled increase  9707  92.6% 
Avslstep  22295.4  Grade creep  835.2  8.0% 
Acasl  23040.6  83.5%  Overall increase  10487.8 
Acin 72 82  2259.8  Step creep  -  54.4 
1972-77 
Avsal 72  12552.8  28.4%  Scheduled increase  3567.9  96.6% 
Acin 72 17  16120.7  Step creep  -  66.9 
Avslstep  16053.8  -  16.4  Grade creep  170.8  5.2% 
Acasl 77  16244.6  29.4  Overall increase  3691.8 
1977- 82 
Avsal 72  16244.6  38.1%  Scheduled increase  6185.6  91.0% 
Acin 72 77  22430.2  Step creep  41.6 
Avslstep  22471.8  -21.  Grade creep  568.8  8.4 
Acasl 77  23040.6  41.8%  Overall increase  679.6 205  Public Sector Wages and Employment Response 
Appendix C 
Note on Sources for Public Sector Pay and 
Employment 
Time series on relative wages were calculated from the following sources. 
1. Average salary for full-time equivalent employees is found in the 
National Income and Products Accounts produced by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
2. Average salary for full-time federal employees (General Service, 
Wage System, Postal and other pay systems) employed on March 31 
of each year is found in the Pay Structure of the Federul Civil Service 
published by the Office of Personnel Management. 
3. Relative pay of  general schedule employees for comparable oc- 
cupations is calculated in the National Survey of Professional Admin- 
istration, Technical and Clerical employees (PATC surveys) published 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
4. Average salaries and employment based on October payroll are 
found in the Bureau of the Census Series (Public Employment, Series 
5. Relative pay differentials controlling for geographic personnel and 
human capital characteristics were calculated from the March and May 
Current Population Survey tapes for 1973, 1978, and 1983. The March 
tapes survey annual earnings for the previous year; only those workers 
for whom industry and occupation did not change were included. In- 
dustry and Occupation codes for 1980 were implemented in 1983. This 
led to some exaggeration  of the increase in the coefficient on local 
GE-1). 
Table 8.A.3  Sample Sizes for Statistical Analysis 
1973  1978  1983 
March  May  March  May  March  May 
Postal  384  407  448  350  419  117 
Federal public  827  700  1,082  83  I  1,105  260 
State public  30 1  317  588  498  870  215 
Local public  388  78  1  1,120  914  1,081  245 




Nonpublic  2,532  3,325  4,812  4,125  4,813  1,183 
Private  25,735  28,016  35,436  30,876  37,581  9,826 
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public administration employees compared to similar regressions using 
the 1970 classifications on the 1982 data. Sample sizes for each level 
of government in each year are shown in table 8.A.3. 
Note 
“How  Do  Public Sector Wages and  Employment Respond  to Economic 
Conditions?”  was written for NBER’s Public Sector Employment and Payroll 
Conference.  Edward Funkhouser provided  excellent research assistance for 
this project. 
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Comment  Sam Peltzman 
Richard Freeman has, in his typically competent and thorough fashion, 
documented some important facts about the recent history of public 
sector wages and employment. The facts are, essentially, that the last 
decade has been “bad” for government employees while the previous 
decade was especially  “good.”  Neither my own limited expertise in 
these matters nor my respect for Freeman’s move me to quarrel with 
these results or comment on their detail. Instead I will try to fit the 
facts about government employment and wages into a larger perspec- 
tive:  that of  trends in  the allocation of  resources within the public 
sector. In particular, I want to show that changes in the composition 
of public  sector (especially federal) budgets have had  an important 
bearing on some of the facts Freeman documents, perhaps more im- 
portant than changes in the size of those budgets. 
First, some essential, if elementary, background. As a broad gen- 
eralization,  governments  have  two  important  tasks.  They  provide 
“public goods”  such as defense and highways, and they redistribute 
wealth by providing private benefits that are, to some degree, financed 
by  nonbeneficiaries.  Most every government activity,  including the 
provision of public goods, has redistributive elements-for  example, 
decisions on the location of military bases and highways can generate 
or destroy economic rents. But the two most prominent forms of re- 
distribution are direct money transfers to individuals (e.g., Social Se- 
Sam Peltzman is professor of economics at the Graduate School of Business, Uni- 
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curity) and provision of publicly financed benefits in kind (e.g.,  free 
public education). 
Over the last thirty years or so, government expenditures have grown 
relative to national income, and most of this growth has come from 
expansion of redistributive activities. For example, from 1950 to 1980 
government spending at all levels-federal,  state and local-rose  from 
about 25 percent to 36 percent of GNP, or 11 percentage points. About 
9 of these 11 percentage points are attributable to expansion of public 
education, public welfare, and Social Security. More recently-in  the 
last decade or so-the  composition of expenditures on redistribution 
has shifted away from education and toward expenditures on the aged 
and poor. In fact, since 1970, education expenditures have grown less 
than either GNP or government spending. These trends are, of course, 
related to corresponding demographic trends-the  continual aging of 
the population and the post-World  War I1 cycle in birth rates. 
My emphasis on these compositional changes in government budgets 
is motivated  by  a simple fact:  There is great  heterogeneity among 
government programs in their “labor intensity.”  That is, payrolls are 
allocated much differently than total expenditures. This is especially 
true at the federal level. Table C8.1 summarizes the basic facts for the 
five agencies with the most employees. Two agencies-Defense  and 
Postal Service-account  for over two-thirds of total federal civilian 
employment, but less than one-third of total spending. The labor in- 
tensity of these operations  stands in  sharp contrast to those of  the 
rapidly  growing redistributive programs centered  in the Health and 
Human Services Department: HHS spends roughly 7 times as much 
per employee as the federal average, 10 times as much as Defense, and 
50 times as much as the Postal Service. We  need look no further for 
most of the explanation of the relative decline of federal employment 
over the last thirty years or so. While total spending has grown relative 
Table CS.1  Civilian Distribution of Employment and Expenditures for Five 
Federal Agencies with Most Employees, 1982 
Percent of Total  Expenditures 
per Employee 
Agency  Employment  Expenditures  ($ooo) 
Defense  35.7%  24.8%  183 
Postal service  23.2  3.1  35 
Veterans  8.2  3.2  103 
HHS  5.2  33.8  1709 
Treasury  4.4  1.5  873 
All other  23.3  33.6  379 
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  262 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of  the U.S.,  1982. 209  Public Sector Wages and Employment Response 
to GNP, spending at the two megaemployers has declined. For example, 
Defense and Postal expenditures declined from roughly 10 percent of 
GNP to 7 percent from  1955 to 1982.  In short, because of the very 
rapid growth of non-labor-intensive transfers, the federal government 
is becoming much less labor intensive even as it grows moderately 
faster than the private economy. This “explains”  one of Freeman’s 
facts-the  steady shrinkage in relative employment-but  not another- 
the sharp rise in relative pay in the late 1960s and early 1970s. I will 
leave that rise for others to explain. If I am correct about the shrinking 
demand for federal employment in this period, I can only suggest that 
we will have to look to labor supply factors for the explanation. 
Changes in the composition  of  state and local spending have also 
contributed to changes in these governmental labor markets, but to a 
smaller degree than those at the federal level. Table C8.2, which is 
organized the same way as table (28.1, provides some background for 
this conclusion. Notice first that the state and local sector is both more 
labor intensive and less heterogeneous in this dimension than the fed- 
eral sector. Spending per state and local employee is on the order of 
one-tenth of  that of the federal level, and it ranges much less widely 
across functions. So the potential for shifts in the composition of state 
and local spending to induce important changes in the overall demand 
for employment is much smaller than at the federal level. Moreover, 
the shifts that have occurred have been milder. Education is and has 
been for a long time the most important factor by far in state and local 
spending and employment. Nor  has its expenditure or employment 
share changed much over the last thirty years or so. The one notable 
change in this period has been in highway spending and employment. 
From 1955 to 1980 the share of both spending and employment on this 
activity fell by about half. Most of this drop had occurred by 1970, as 
Table C8.2  Distribution of State and Local Expenditures and Employment, 
1980 
Function 
Percent of Total  Expenditures 
per Employee 
Employment  Expenditures  ($ow 
Education  48.3%  36.2%  25 
Health & hospitals  11.7  8.8  25 
Police/fire  7.4  5.2  23 
Highways  4.8  9.  I  63 
Welfare  3.4  12.4  121 
Other  24.4  28.3  39 
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  33 
Source: US.  Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S.,  1980. 210  Richard B. Freeman 
the large interstate highway building program wound down. Since the 
highway function is relatively non-labor intensive (see table C8.2), the 
shift away from it had moderately favorable implications for the demand 
for state and local labor employees. But this contribution to the rise 
in relative employment up to about 1970, which Freeman documents 
pales beside that of the growth of education. 
Table C8.3 provides some relevant data for two subperiods:  1955- 
70, when  state and local relative  employment and wages were both 
rising; and 1970-80,  when the former was essentially unchanged and 
the latter fell. Noneducation relative employment has and continues to 
grow modestly. But something like two-thirds to three-fourths of the 
pre-1970 growth and  all of  the post-1970 flattening of  total relative 
employment are coming from public education. Table C8.3 also shows 
the by now familiar demographic basis of  the changes in the demand 
for education employment-the  post-World  War I1 rise and fall of the 
pupil population. 
There is, I think,  a broad  conclusion  to which this brief tour of 
employment and expenditure history leads. It is that changes in the 
demand for redistribution and its age composition are going to drive 
the demand for government labor in the future just as they have in 
the past. Unless birth rates increase dramatically, the population will 
continue to age. That has mainly negative  implications  for the de- 
mand for government labor:  It will continue to restrict  the demand 
for labor-intensive  education  services and increase  the demand for 
non-labor-intensive transfers. Thus demography and a long-term shift 
from  public  goods  to redistribution  seem  to portend  a  continued 
reduction in  relative employment  at both  the federal and state and 
local levels. 
Table C8.3  Relative Employment Trends and School Enrollment Rates, 
1955-80 
Variable  1955  1970  1980 
State and local government 
employment as percent of total 
civilian employment 
Total state and local  7.2%  10.8%  10.9% 
Noneducation  4.2  5.3  5.6 
Public education  3.0  5.5  5.3 
Public elementary and  18.0  22.7  18.2 
secondary 
school enrollment as 
percent of population 
Source: U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts of  the  U.S.  and Historical 
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No discussion of the demand for public employment can overlook 
the role of “politics.”  After all, public budgets and payrolls are deter- 
mined within a political process, and public employees are in the un- 
usual position of having the potential for affecting the demand for their 
services by organizing to bring pressure on that process. It is therefore 
tempting to search for a political explanation for seemingly anomalous 
facts, such as the late 1960s rise in the relative pay of federal workers. 
Indeed, the rapid growth of public sector unionization and the attendant 
increase in organized pressure just prior to the late 1960s  make the 
connection plausible. Perhaps someone will show that unionization of 
the postal service can help explain what happened to federal employees 
in the late 1960s. But my reading of state and local data indicates that 
any increase in the political visibility of state and local employees had 
little impact on the demand for their services. For example, compare 
politically determined expenditures with private expenditures on ele- 
mentary and secondary education. Since 1960 the private sector has 
steadily enrolled a bit under 15 percent of all such students. If the new 
public sector unions  successfully raised  the demand for public edu- 
cation, we ought to have seen a sharp increase in the ratio of expen- 
ditures per public school pupil to expenditures per private school pupil 
in the late 1960s. In fact this ratio was 1.2 in 1960, rose to 1.3 in 1966, 
and declined to 1.2 by 1970, where it has remained since. So both the 
public and private sectors seem to have responded to the same forces 
in about the same way. 
These aggregated data may, of  course, be hiding important  local 
effects of politics.  One has to worry about this possibility  because 
neither the rise  of  public  sector unions  nor the receptivity  of  gov- 
ernments to organized pressure on their behalf is regionally uniform. 
If there is a “political effect,” it should show up in heavily unionized 
“liberal”  areas  rather  than  in  basically  non-union  “conservative” 
areas. However, a quick look at state-level data on growth of teacher 
salaries over the  whole  cycle beginning in  the  mid-1960s does not 
reveal any  substantial local  political  effects.  I regressed  the  1965- 
82  change  in  the log  of  average  public  elementary  school teacher 
salaries (ATCHR) on the change in the 1965-82  log of average hourly 
earnings in manufacturing  (AAHE) in the state and on two political 
variables:  (1) the fraction of the state’s  nonagricultural  workers un- 
ionized in  1970  (UNZON), and (2) George McGovern’s share of the 
state’s 1972 popular vote (MCGOV). The latter is meant as a proxy 
for bedrock liberal sentiment among a state’s electorate, while  UNZON 
is meant to proxy for both the degree of  public sector unionization 
(I had no  state-level data on this) and the importance of the public 
employees’ most natural political allies. The results were (t-ratios in 
parentheses) 212  Richard B. Freeman 
ATCHR  = 7.4 -I- .37 AAHE - .14 MCGOV + .06 UNION; 
(1.8)  (0.6)  (0.4) 
R2 = .09, SEE = .09, 
N  = 48 states (excludes Alaska and Hawaii). 
Clearly, neither political variable “works” in that both their coefficients 
are indistinguishable from zero.  Another way of  showing much the 
same thing is to examine the regional pattern  of residuals from the 
simple regression 
ATCHR  = .67 + .39 AAHE ; 
(2.1) 
R2  = .09, 
SEE = .09. 
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E. S. Central 
W.  S. Central 
(includes DE, MD) 
Avg. of State 
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-  .09 
-  .04 







The regions are listed so that the more liberal, heavily unionized areas 
in the North and Midwest come near the top. But these areas do not 
appear to have unusually large public-school-teacher wage growth; in 
fact, if  anything, the positive residuals tend to be found in the conser- 
vative South and West. Perhaps more to the point, there is really not 
much for “politics” to explain: the standard deviation of the dependent 
variable is only .09 around a mean of + 1.14. Given this rather uniform 
pattern of public-school-teacher  wage growth in the aftermath of the 
rise of public sector unions, even a highly significant (in the statistical 
sense) political effect could not amount to much money. 
These matters deserve more attention than I can give them here. The 
analysis needs refinement; public school teachers are only one group, 213  Public Sector Wages and Employment Response 
though an important group, among a variety of public employees. And 
even if  the political process did not respond much to the pressures 
engendered by the rise of  public sector unions in the 1960s, this does 
not mean that the process never provides politically based  rents to 
workers. However, in the specific case of the cycle that Freeman doc- 
uments-the  rise  and fall of  the demand  for state and local public 
employees from the mid-1960s to now-the  specific role of  the rise in 
organized pressure from public employees seems modest beside that 
of demography and the more general political factors determining the 
allocation of budgets. 
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Incentive Structures of  Local 
Public Pension Plans 
Howard L. Frant and Herman B. Leonard 
Public pension systems have been much criticized, but their details 
have been studied relatively little. Studies of federal pension plans have 
revealed substantial accumulations of unfunded liabilities facing future 
taxpayers, and both government and private studies of state and local 
pension plans have indicated that these problems are common, though 
not universal, in lower-level jurisdictions as well. But while there have 
been some studies of the aggregate impacts of these plans, little atten- 
tion has been paid to the level and form of the incentives they create. 
The differences across jurisdictions are frequently quite dramatic. The 
level and timing of pension benefits and of the accrual of pension rights 
by employees-and  the work incentives thereby created-are  strikingly 
variable across plans. Our primary purpose in what follows is to de- 
scribe that variation and give some insight into its sources. We  will not 
explicitly concern ourselves with developing a theory to account for 
the observed facts, but neither will we wholly resist the tendency of 
some of the more remarkable facts to speak for themselves about theory. 
We examine 94 local employee public pension plans from thirty-three 
states. Of these, 67 cover general employees or teachers, and 27 cover 
police or fire employees. Some plans are state-administered; most are 
locally administered. The plans we describe are among those investi- 
gated in Arnold (1983); they represent a subset for which there were 
adequate data to conduct our examination. These systems cover more 
than  2.9 million employees.'  The plans  do not  represent a random 
sample, so the statistics we will cite should be taken as roughly indic- 
ative rather than precisely descriptive. 
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Howard L. Frant  is a doctoral candidate in  public policy  at  the  John F.  Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University. 
School of Government, Harvard University. 
215 216  Howard L. Frantmerman B. Leonard 
This chapter describes the character and variety of public pension 
plans, examines the roles played by certain features of these plans, 
and assesses their relative importance. We focus on the time profile of 
pension wealth and wealth accruals. Pension wealth accrual is the in- 
crement to a worker’s wealth in a given year as a result of  increases 
in pension rights granted in that year, just as conventionally measured 
labor income is the increase in a worker’s wealth resulting from wages 
and salaries. Pension wealth accruals are thus an element of total worker 
compensation; to understand the time profile and consequent incentive 
effects of public compensation, we need to understand the time profile 
of pension accruals. 
Our work parallels research of Kotlikoff and Wise (1984) describing 
private sector plans. Aside from the fact that public sector plans cover 
large numbers of  employees, there are two (possibly contradictory) 
reasons why we might be interested in looking at these plans. First, 
they may have different labor market properties or be determined by 
different factors than private sector plans. Second, because these plans 
are not covered  by  federal pension  law, they  represent  a less con- 
strained and therefore richer universe of possible features. 
9.1  Some Features of the Plans 
Form. All of the plans we are examining are defined benefit plans- 
pensions are determined by formula, typically related to years of ser- 
vice and to salary in the last year or last few years before retirement. 
Nearly all of our plans have formulas of the form 
Pension  = BAR  x  YOS  x  SALAVG, 
where BAR is the benefit accrual rate; YOS,  the years of service; and 
SALAVG, the average salary received in  a specified number of  years 
prior to retirement. Three- and five-year final salary averaging are the 
most common, though pensions based only on salary in the last year 
are not uncommon in our plans.  A few plans have two- or four-year 
final salary averaging; one plan averages salaries in the final ten years. 
Benefit  accrual  rates. In  general, these  plans  appear to be more 
generous than private sector plans. While Kotlikoff and Wise (1984) 
describe a typical private plan as having a benefit accrual rate  (the 
percentage of  average final earnings that the worker receives per year 
of service) of 1 percent, rates in public plans with a single rate ranged 
from 1 percent to 3.33 percent, with a mean of  1.9 percent and a mode 
and median of 2 percent. About three-fifths of the plans had some ceiling 
on accrual of benefits. 
Cost-ofliving increases. Nearly half of  the plans have explicit pro- 
vision for a cost-of-living (COL) increase to pensioners. The provisions 